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I. INTRODUCTION
After two years of political maneuvering and often-times heated
debate, the Civil Rights Act of 1991 (S 1745) received its final Congres-
sional blessing on November 7, 1991. This new law became effective
immediately upon President Bush's signature on November 21, 1991.1
As originally proposed in 1990, the Civil Rights Act was in large
part a response to a series of politically unpopular decisions by the
U.S. Supreme Court during its 1989 term. Of particular concern to the
civil rights community and liberal Democrats were the following five
decisions:
- Patterson v. McLean Credit Union,2 in which the Supreme Court
ruled that an 1866 statute3 does not prohibit racial harassment and
other forms of race discrimination that extend beyond the "mak-
* 1981, J.D., University of Nebraska. Mr. Loudon is a partner at Berens & Tate,
P.C., a management-side labor and employment law firm headquartered in
Omaha, Nebraska.
I would like to extend special thanks to Thomas R. Ostdiek, a second-year
student at Creighton University School of Law, for his assistance in the research
and preparation of this Article.
1. 226 Daily Lab. Rep. A-12 (BNA)(Nov. 22, 1991).
2. 491 U.S. 164 (1989).
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866).
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ing" or "enforcement" of a "contract." Impact. The Civil Rights
Act of 1991 overturns Patterson and amends this statute by broad-
ening its scope to encompass all "benefits, privileges, terms, and
conditions" of the contractual relationship, including the perform-
ance, modification, or termination of a contract. (The term "con-
tract" is used in the broadest sense possible; it applies to all aspects
of the employment relationship, even if employment is on an "at-
will" basis.)
- Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc. v. Atonio,4 in which the Supreme
Court drastically altered the burden of proof applicable to the so-
called "disparate impact" theory of discrimination. Impact. The
Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturns Wards Cove by requiring the
employer to show that an employment practice is justified by
"business necessity," once a person proves that a particular em-
ployment practice (or the decision-making process in general, if a
particular employment practice cannot be isolated from the deci-
sion-making process) has a "disparate impact" on a protected class.
- Martin v. Wilks,5 in which the Supreme Court allowed white fire
fighters to collaterally attack a consent decree many years after its
issuance. Impact. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 overturns Wilks by
providing that those persons who might be adversely affected by a
consent decree must be provided a reasonable opportunity to chal-
lenge the order. However, subsequent legal challenges would be
barred absent unusual circumstances.
- Lorance v. AT&T Technologies, Inc.,6 in which the Supreme Court
ruled that the time limit for challenging a discriminatory seniority
system begins to run when the plan is adopted, not when the plan
is applied to a specific individual. Impact. The Civil Rights Act of
1991 overturns Lorance by permitting individual challenges to dis-
criminatory seniority plans in three potential settings: when the
seniority system is adopted; when an individual becomes subject to
its terms; or when an individual is injured by its specific application
to him or her.
- Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins,7 in which the Supreme Court indi-
cated that an employer will escape liability in "mixed motive"
cases (i.e., when an employer is motivated in part by discriminatory
reasons and in part by legitimate considerations) if the employer
can establish that it would have made the same decision absent the
discriminatory motive. Impact. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 over-
turns Price Waterhouse by providing that any reliance on a dis-
criminatory reason is illegal.
4. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
5. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
6. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
7. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
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As the 1990 version of the Civil Rights Act tracked its way through
the House (HR 4000) and Senate (S 2104), it became clear that the
legislation was intended to go well beyond simply reversing the five
Supreme Court decisions noted above. For example, while damages
available under existing laws typically provided only for the recovery
of actual damages (e.g., lost wages, restoration of benefits, etc.) suf-
fered by the plaintiff, the Civil Rights Act provided for compensatory
and punitive damages as well. In addition, the legislation provided for
jury trials upon request in all cases alleging intentional discrimination.
The Senate version of the 1990 Civil Rights Act was passed by the
Senate in July 1990 by a 65-34 margin.8 The House version of the 1990
Civil Rights Act was passed by the House in August 1990 by a vote of
272-154.9 A consolidated version of the 1990 Civil Rights Act was ve-
toed by President Bush in October 1990, as the President continued to
lambast the legislation as a "quota bill." Attempts to override Presi-
dent Bush's veto were narrowly defeated.
Nearly an identical version of the 1990 Act was introduced into the
House in January 1991 (HR 1).10 Shortly thereafter, the Supreme
Court added more fuel to the debate by handing down two additional
decisions which were unpopular to the civil rights community:
- EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co.,11 in which the Supreme Court
ruled that the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (Title VII)12 does not extend
its protection to American citizens working outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, even where the employer is incor-
porated in the United States. Impact. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
overturns this ruling by providing that American citizens working
in foreign countries are generally protected by U.S. civil rights laws
if the employer is an American-owned or controlled company.
- West Virginia University Hospitals, Inc. v. Casey,13 in which the
Supreme Court ruled that expert witness fees are not recoverable
by a prevailing plaintiff as a form of attorneys' fees under the At-
torneys' Fees Awards Act.14 Impact. The Civil Rights Act of 1991
overturns this decision by providing that expert witness fees may
be recoverable under the attorneys' fees provisions of most federal
civil rights laws.
The House version of the 1991 Civil Rights Act (HR 1) passed the
House in June 1991 by a margin of 273 to 158.15 As the Senate began
to debate its version of the 1991 Act (Sen. Danforth, R. Mo., actually
8. 140 Daily Lab. Rep. A-9 (BNA)(July 20, 1990).
9. 151 Daily Lab. Rep., A-6 (BNA)(Aug. 6, 1990).
10. 4 Daily Lab. Rep., A-2 (BNA)(Jan. 7, 1991).
11. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
12. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1988).
13. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
14. 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976).
15. 109 Daily Lab. Rep. A-9 (BNA)(June 6, 1991).
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introduced three versions of the bill in an effort to win White House
approval: S 1407, S 1408 and S 1409),16 it was widely believed that Con-
gress would be unable to mount a veto-proof margin under any ver-
sion of the Act.
So, what happened to ensure passage of the 1991 Civil Rights Act?
Ironically, the Clarence Thomas confirmation hearings proved to
be the final impetus for passage of this new law. Somehow the debate
came to focus upon Professor Anita Hill, sexual harassment, and the
general unavailability of economic relief for victims of sexual harass-
ment. With the uproar over the confirmation of Clarence Thomas to
the United States Supreme Court, and the likely impact of the confir-
mation vote in an election year, President Bush's veto-proof margin
began to fade. Through last-minute negotiations, a compromise, bi-
partisan version of the Civil Rights Act (S 1745) received the Presi-
dent's support. Language was inserted into the bill to alleviate Presi-
dent Bush's concern that the legislation would lead to the adoption of
informal "quotas." 17
II. GENERAL OVERVIEW
The major highlights of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, in summary
fashion, include the following:
- The 1866 Civil Rights Act's is amended to clarify that all forms of
race and ethnic discrimination (including harassment) are unlaw-
ful under the statute-not merely the "making" or "enforcement"
of a contract;19
- Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196420 is amended to provide
that punitive and compensatory damages are now available in cases
of intentional discrimination on the basis of an individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin;2 1
- The Americans With Disabilities Act of 199022 is amended to pro-
vide that punitive and compensatory damages are now available in
cases of intentional discrimination on the basis of an individual's
disability or handicap status (such damages are not allowable, how-
ever, if the employer can show that it made a good faith effort, in
consultation with the disabled individual, to reasonably accommo-
16. 127 Daily Lab. Rep. A-10, (BNA)(July 2, 1991).
17. 208 Daily Lab. Rep. A-l1, (BNA)(Oct. 28, 1991).
18. 42 U.S.C. § 1981 (1866).
19. Civil Rights Act Of 1991, Pub. L. No. 102-166, § 101, 105 Stat. 1071 (1991)(hereinaf-
ter Civil Rights Act of 1991).
20. The damages provisions, however, appear as an amendment to 42 U.S.C. § 1981,
rather than as an amendment to Title VII.
21. Civil Rights Act of 1991 § 102 (1991).
22. 42 U.S.C. § 12101 (1991).
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date that individual's disability);23
- Both Title VII and the Americans With Disabilities Act are
amended to provide for the right to trial by jury in those cases
where the complaining party seeks compensatory or punitive
damages;24
- Title VII is amended to provide that, in those cases where the com-
plaining party demonstrates that an employment practice causes a
"disparate impact" on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, or na-
tional origin, the employer will be required to demonstrate that the
challenged practice is job-related and consistent with "business ne-
cessity" (a violation is also established if the complaining party can
demonstrate that a less-discriminatory alternative practice exists,
and the employer refuses to adopt the alternative practice);25
- Title VII is amended to outlaw the practice known as "race
norming";26
- Title VII is amended to provide that any reliance on a discrimina-
tory factor is unlawful, even if other, non-discriminatory reasons
also influenced the decision;27
- Title VII is amended to provide that consent decrees are not sub-
ject to attack in subsequent litigation, provided the potential liti-
gant had notice of the proposed consent decree and an opportunity
to present objections to its terms, or was otherwise represented by
another person who previously challenged the consent decree on
the same legal grounds;28
- Both Title VII and the Americans With Disabilities Act are
amended to clarify that American citizens working in foreign coun-
tries are entitled to protection under these laws, provided the em-
ployer is American-owned or controlled, and provided that
compliance with American law would not violate a law of the for-
eign country;29
- Title VII is amended to clarify that seniority systems are vulnera-
ble to attack not only when adopted, but also when an individual
becomes subject to its terms or is otherwise injured by the applica-
tion of the seniority system;30
- Title VII and the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act are amended to clar-
ify that expert witness fees are also recoverable as a form of attor-
neys' fees;3 1
23. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(a)(3)(1991).
24. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 102(c)(1991).
25. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 105 (1991).
26. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 106 (1991).
27. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 107(a)(1991).
28. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 108 (1991).
29. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 109 (1991).
30. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 112 (1991).
31. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 113 (1991).
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- The Age Discrimination In Employment Act32 is amended to adopt
the "right to sue" procedures available under Title VII;33
- A "Glass Ceiling Commission" is established to examine why wo-
men and minorities are excluded from management and decision-
making positions in business and to prepare recommendations
designed to foster their advancement to such positions;3 4
- Many provisions of the Federal civil rights laws will be extended to
employees of the House and Senate, as well as Presidential appoin-
tees, although the procedural and remedial framework varies
considerably;35
- Previously-exempt State employees (e.g., those individuals chosen
or appointed by a person elected to public office) are now protected
against discrimination on the basis of race, color, religion, sex, na-
tional origin, age, handicap or disability status;36
- The Act is effective upon enactment (e.g., November 21, 1991), un-
less otherwise specifically provided.3 7
III. SECTION-BY-SECTION ANALYSIS
The Civil Rights Act of 1991 is comprised of five "Titles." Title I is
a broad-based redrafting of the rights and remedies available under
existing federal civil rights laws. Title II, the so-called "Glass Ceiling
Act of 1991," establishes the Glass Ceiling Commission to conduct a
study concerning the elimination of barriers to the advancement of
women and minorities in the workplace, and to prepare recommenda-
tions to foster their advancement to management and decision-making
positions in business. Title III, the so-called "Government Employee
Rights Act of 1991," extends certain protection under federal civil
rights laws to the Senate and other government employees to be free
from discrimination. Title IV simply provides the effective date of this
legislation, as well as a "savings" clause in the event any portion of the
Act is struck down as being invalid. Title V amends Section 1205 of
Public Law 101-628, which established the Civil War Sites Advisory
Commission.
A. Title I
Section 101 amends the 1866 Civil Rights Act by providing that the
term "make and enforce contracts" includes the making, performance,
modification, and termination of contracts, as well as the enjoyment of
32. 29 U.S.C. 626(e)(1967).
33. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 115 (1991).
34. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 203 (1991).
35. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 301-325 (1991).
36. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 321 (1991).
37. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402 (1991).
1992]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
all benefits, privileges, terms, and conditions of the contractual rela-
tionship. Section 101 also clarifies that the rights protected under this
law are free from impairment by both governmental and non-govern-
mental parties.
Impact. The 1866 law has been interpreted to prohibit discrimina-
tion only on the basis of an individual's race or ethnic origin. The
amendments do not expand the classes of persons entitled to protec-
tion under the 1866 law; rather, the amendments simply clarify that
all forms of discrimination in the employment relationship-not
merely the "making" and "enforcement" of a contract--are unlawful.
As a result, claims of racial and ethnic harassment may now be
brought under this statute, effectively overturning the Supreme
Court's Patterson3S ruling.
Section 102 of the Act provides for damages in cases of intentional
discrimination. Section 102(a)(1) amends the 1866 Civil Rights Act by
providing that, in cases of intentional discrimination brought under
Title VII, the complaining party may recover compensatory and puni-
tive damages, in addition to any other form of relief previously author-
ized by Title VII.
Impact. This amendment will allow for the availability of compen-
satory and punitive damages in all cases alleging intentional discrimi-
nation. Prohibited forms of discrimination include discrimination
based on an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Section 102(a)(2) extends the same availability for compensatory
and punitive damages to cases of intentional discrimination against in-
dividuals on the basis of their handicap or disability. This section is a
technical amendment to the Americans With Disabilities Act of 1990
(prohibiting discrimination on the basis of disability) and the Rehabili-
tation Act of 197339 (prohibiting discrimination against handicapped
individuals by federal contractors, federal sub-contractors, and recipi-
ents of federal financial assistance).
Impact. The Americans With Disabilities Act was signed into law
by President Bush on July 26, 1990, in large part, because of a compro-
mise measure disallowing punitive and compensatory damages for vic-
tims of disability discrimination. The Civil Rights Act of 1991 renders
this compromise a nullity.
Section 102(a)(3) provides that, where the alleged discrimination
involves the failure to "reasonably accommodate" an individual's disa-
bility, compensatory and punitive damages may not be awarded if the
employer can show that it made a "good faith effort," in consultation
with the disabled individual, to identify and make a "reasonable ac-
commodation" to the disabled individual.
38. 491 U.s. 164 (1989).
39. 29 U.S.C. §§ 701-796(i)(1982).
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Impact. In the limited situation where an employer is charged
with failing to "reasonably accommodate" an individual's disability,
the employer can escape compensatory and punitive damages, pro-
vided it can show that it made a "good faith effort" to accommodate
the individual. As a result, the legitimacy of an employer's efforts to
"reasonably accommodate" disabled individuals will become a future
litigation battleground for disability discrimination claims.
Section 102(b)(1) allows for the recovery of punitive damages in
cases where the complaining party demonstrates that the employer
discriminated against him or her with "malice" or with "reckless indif-
ference" to the individual's civil rights.
Impact. The "reckless indifference" standard will implicate virtu-
ally every case involving allegations of intentional discrimination. As
a result, punitive damages will be potentially available in the vast ma-
jority of cases.
Section 102(b)(2) provides that compensatory damages do not in-
dude back pay, interest on back pay, and other types of relief available
under Title VII.
Impact. This section clarifies that compensatory damages are in
addition to actual damages available for back pay, interest, and similar
forms of relief, which are currently available under Title VII.
Section 102(b)(3) provides a limitation on the amount of compensa-
tory and punitive damages available to a prevailing party in cases of
intentional discrimination. The combined sum of compensatory dam-
ages (including damages for future pecuniary losses, emotional pain,
suffering, inconvenience, mental anguish, loss of enjoyment of life,
and other non-pecuniary losses) and punitive damages (i.e., damages
designed to deter or punish an employer) are tied to the size of the
employer in the following fashion:
A) damages of up to $50,000 for employers employing 15-100
employees;
B) damages of up to $100,000 for employers employing 101-200
employees;
C) damages of up to $200,000 for employers employing 201-500 em-
ployees; and
D) damages of up to $300,000 for employers employing more than
500 employees.40
Impact This section of the Act establishes certain "caps" on the
40. On November 26, 1991, Sen. Edward Kennedy (D-Mass.) and Rep. Barbara Ken-
nelly (D-Conn.) introduced legislation (The Equal Remedies Act of 1991) to
amend the Civil Rights Act of 1991 by removing all of the caps on compensatory
and punitive damages (S 2062). On the same day, Sen. Orrin Hatch (R-Utah)
introduced a separate proposal (Employee Equity and Job Preservation Act of
1991) that retains only the $50,000 cap on damage awards for employers with 50 or
fewer employees (S 2053). 229 Daily Lab. Rep. A-6 (BNA)(Nov. 27, 1991). Sen.
1992]
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amount of compensatory and punitive damages available to com-
plaining parties, based on the size of the employing entity. In deter-
mining the number of employees employed by an employer who may
have multi-site locations, the employees at each location are typically
added together in determining the threshold number of employees.
This will normally depend on whether there is "common control" over
the various operations. More significantly, it is anticipated that the
"caps" available under this section will be quickly converted into
"floors" based on the size of the employer.
Section 102(b)(4) clarifies that the foregoing "caps" do not apply to
cases alleging discrimination under the 1866 Civil Rights Act.
Impact. This means that in cases of racial and ethnic discrimina-
tion, compensatory and punitive damages potentially will be unlim-
ited in amount, as they are under existing interpretations of the 1866
law.
Section 102(c) provides that where compensatory or punitive dam-
ages are sought by the complaining party, either party may request a
trial by jury. The court is prohibited from informing the jury of the
various "caps" noted above.
Impact. The availability of trial by jury is a significant victory for
the plaintiffs' bar. It is a well-known fact that juries tend to be more
sympathetic to the "little guy," as opposed to the "heartless" corporate
entity. Prior to the passage of the Civil Rights Act of 1991, jury trials
were unavailable under Title VII. Since most cases of discrimination
involve allegations of intentional violations of the law, virtually all
plaintiffs will now seek compensatory and punitive damages, thus trig-
gering the availability of trial by jury. The odds of prevailing in em-
ployment discrimination cases, from the employer's perspective, will
now be significantly reduced. The prohibition against advising the
jury of the various "caps" on damages could help prevent the "caps"
from becoming "floors."
Section 102(d) defines the term "complaining party" to include the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney General,
and any other person entitled to bring an action under Title VII, the
Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Americans With Disabilities Act of
1990.
Impact. Both the government and non-governmental plaintiffs
will be entitled to bring an action for the recovery of those damages
outlined above.
Section 103 amends the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act to provide for
the recovery of attorneys' fees under these new amendments.
Impact. This amendment clarifies that prevailing plaintiffs, other
Kennedy's bill was approved by the Senate Labor and Human Resources Com-
mittee on March 11, 1992. 49 Daily Lab. Rep. A-11 (BNA)(Mar. 12, 1992).
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than the United States, will be entitled to the recovery of attorneys'
fees in any action brought under the Civil Right Act of 1991.41
Section 104 incorporates new definitions into Title VII, including
definitions of the terms "complaining party", "demonstrates", and
"respondent."
Impact. As noted above, the term "complaining party" includes
the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission, the Attorney Gen-
eral, and any other person entitled to bring an action under Title VII.
The term "demonstrates" refers to the burden of proof in litigating
discrimination claims. The term "respondent" includes employers,
employment agencies, labor organizations, joint-labor management
committees controlling apprenticeship or other training or retraining
programs, and federal entities subject to Title VII.
Section 105 addresses the burden of proof in "disparate impact"
cases. This section amends Title VII by providing that disparate im-
pact is established if:
1) a complaining party demonstrates that the employer uses a par-
ticular employment practice that causes a "disparate impact" on
the basis of race, color, religion, sex or national origin, and the
employer fails to demonstrate that the practice is job-related
and consistent with "business necessity"; or
2) the complaining party demonstrates that an alternative employ-
ment practice exists which does not have an unlawful "disparate
impact," and that the employer refuses to adopt the alternative
practice.
The complaining party is generally required to identify a particular
or specific employment practice that causes the "disparate impact,"
except in those cases where the complaining party can demonstrate
that the elements of an employer's decision-making process are not
capable of separation for analysis. In that event, the decision-making
process may be analyzed as a single employment practice.
The employer may defend against a "disparate impact" claim by
demonstrating that a specific employment practice does not cause the
impact, or otherwise by establishing that the practice is both job-re-
lated and consistent with "business necessity." In defining the term
"business necessity," courts must consider case law as it existed prior
to the Supreme Court's 1989 decision in Wards Cove Packing Co., Inc.
v. Atonio.42
Finally, an employer's rule barring the employment of individuals
who currently use or possess controlled substances will not be deemed
41. On February 19, 1992, Rep. Robert Andrews (D-N.J.) introduced legislation (HR
4242) that would require an award of attorneys' fees to the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission when it is the prevailing party. 35 Daily Lab. Rep. A-19
(BNA)(Feb. 21, 1992).
42. 490 U.S. 642 (1989).
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unlawful, even if the rule results in a "disparate impact" on a "pro-
tected class," unless it can be shown that the rule was adopted or ap-
plied with an intent to discriminate.
Impact. Oddly enough, this section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991
became the focal point of Congressional debate. This is the section of
the Act that President Bush referred to as inviting the implementa-
tion of "quotas." In essence, this section of the Act largely restores the
case law as it existed prior to the Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in
Wards Cove.43 The requirement that the complaining party must iso-
late a particular employment practice causing the disparate impact
represents a compromise measure.
The "disparate impact" theory of discrimination involves neutral
employment practices that are not discriminatory on their face, but
which result in discrimination in their application or effect on a "pro-
tected class" (i.e., race, color, religion, sex, or national origin). Exam-
ples include height and weight standards,44 certain educational
requirements,45 use of arrest 46 and conviction records, 47 use of credit
history information,48 and similar practices that are neutral on their
face. In order to establish a "disparate impact" claim, the complaining
party must show that the challenged criterion disproportionately im-
pacts members of a protected class, as compared to the majority class.
This demonstration is usually made through the use of statistical
analyses.
By and large, "disparate impact" cases are fairly infrequent, as
compared to cases alleging intentional discrimination (i.e., "disparate
treatment" cases). In fact, the authors of a recent study published in
the May, 1991 issue of the Stanford Law Review estimate that dispa-
rate impact cases accounted for less than 2% of all discrimination suits
filed between January 1, 1985 - March 31, 1987.49
Finally, compensatory and punitive damages are not available in
cases alleging disparate impact; nor are complaining parties entitled to
trial by jury in such cases.
Section 106 prohibits the adjustment of test scores on the basis of
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin.
Impact. This section of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 prohibits the
practice known as "race norming" in the use of test scores. Simply
put, different cut-off scores and other adjustment techniques cannot
43. Id.
44. Dothard v. Rawlinson, 433 U.S. 321 (1977).
45. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
46. Gregory v. Litton Sys., Inc., 472 F.2d 631 (9th Cir. 1972).
47. Green v. Missouri Pac. R.R. Co., 523 F.2d 1290 (8th Cir. 1975).
48. Wallace v. Debron Corp., 494 F.2d 674 (8th Cir. 1974)(garnishment rule).
49. John J. Donohue III, Peter Siegelman, The Changing Nature of Employment Dis-
crimination Litigation, 43 STAN. L. REV. 983, 998, n.57 (1991).
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be used to alter the test results of an applicant or employee on the
basis of his or her race, color, religion, sex or national origin.
Section 107(a) amends Title VII by clarifying that a violation of the
law is established when the complaining party can show that race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin was "a motivating factor" for any
employment practice, even though other legitimate factors may have
also motivated the practice.
Impact This section of the Act overturns the Supreme Court's
1989 decision in Price Waterhouse v. Hopkins.50 The amendment
makes clear that an individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
origin must play no factor in the challenged employment practice.
Section 107(b) provides that the employer can limit its damages in
such "mixed motive" cases by proving that it would have taken the
same action in the absence of the discriminatory factor. If the em-
ployer can prove that it would have made the same decision absent the
discriminatory motivation, then the court may only grant declaratory
relief, injunctive relief, and attorneys' fees and costs shown to be di-
rectly attributable to the pursuit of that claim.
Impact If the complaining party can establish that race, color, reli-
gion, sex, or national origin was in any way a motivating factor in the
challenged employment practice, then he or she is entitled to relief
under Title VII. However, if the employer can demonstrate that it
would have made the same decision absent the illegal factor, then the
complaining party is only entitled to limited relief and the recovery of
attorneys' fees and costs. In other words, if the employer can make
such a showing, the court is prohibited from awarding any form of
damages (ie., actual, compensatory, or punitive) or issuing an order
requiring the admission, reinstatement, hiring, promotion, or payment
to the complaining party.
Section 108 amends Title VII by prohibiting challenges to consent
decrees or orders that resolve claims of employment discrimination,
provided the affected individual had actual notice of the proposed de-
cree or order and was provided an opportunity to present objections to
the decree or order, or whose interests were otherwise adequately rep-
resented by another person who challenged the decree or order on the
same legal grounds and with a similar factual situation.
Impact. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturns the
Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in Martin v. Wilks.51 In future cases in-
volving class-wide challenges to employment practices, the agreed-
upon consent decree or court order will be immune to subsequent
legal attack, provided affected individuals had notice of the proposed
decree or order and were provided a reasonable opportunity to present
50. 490 U.S. 228 (1989).
51. 490 U.S. 755 (1989).
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objections to its terms, or were otherwise adequately represented by
another person with a similar legal basis for challenging the consent
decree. This provision should lend some finality to court-approved
consent decrees resolving class-based allegations of discrimination.
Section 109 amends both Title VII and the Americans With Disabil-
ities Act of 1990 by extending the protection of such laws to American
citizens working in foreign countries for an employer that is Ameri-
can-controlled or owned. A limited exception is provided in cases
where compliance with American civil rights laws would cause the
employer to violate the law of the foreign country in which the
worker is employed. In determining whether an employer controls a
corporation, the courts must apply the following factors:
A) The interrelation of operations;
B) Common management;
C) Centralized control of labor relations; and
D) Common ownership or financial control of the employer and
the corporation.
Impact. This section of the Act overturns the Supreme Court's
1991 ruling in EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Company.5 2 This
amendment effectively extends the provisions of Title VII and the
Americans With Disabilities Act to American citizens working in for-
eign countries, provided the employer is an American-owned or con-
trolled company. In short, U.S. civil rights laws will be given
extraterritorial effect where the foreign employer is American-owned
or controlled, except where compliance with American law would vio-
late the laws of the foreign country.
Section 110 amends Title VII by requiring the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to establish a "Technical Assistance Train-
ing Institute," through which the Commission is required to provide
technical assistance and training to the public regarding those laws
and regulations enforced by the Commission. However, failure to
comply with the law will not be excused because of any failure to re-
ceive such technical assistance.
Impact. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act is intended to
allay employer concerns that the Commission is not truly a neutral
party in the investigation and prosecution of alleged civil rights viola-
tions. While it is, indeed, a positive gesture to the employer commu-
nity, given chronic under-funding and under-staffing at the
Commission, it is highly unlikely that technical assistance will be
readily available to the employer community on a convenient, timely
basis.
Section 111 amends Title VII by requiring the Equal Employment
Opportunity Commission to carry out educational and outreach activi-
52. 111 S. Ct. 1227 (1991).
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ties targeted to historical victims of employment discrimination who
have not been equitably served by the Commission in the past, as well
as all other individuals on whose behalf the Commission has authority
to enforce laws prohibiting employment discrimination.
Impact. The Commission has been accused of neglecting certain
minority groups at the expense of others, in particular, Asians and
Spanish-speaking minorities. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act
requires the Commission to target such groups for educational and
outreach activities designed to educate such individuals about their
rights under U.S. civil rights laws.
Section 112 amends Title VII by providing that discriminatory sen-
iority systems may be challenged when the system is adopted, when
an individual becomes subject to its terms, or when an individual is
specifically injured through application of the seniority system to him
or her.
Impact. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturns the
Supreme Court's 1989 ruling in Lorance v. AT&T Technologies.53 In
essence, this section of the Act will allow individuals to challenge dis-
criminatory seniority systems at different points in time-not simply
when the system is adopted. This section will have limited application
to those claims challenging seniority systems as being motivated by
unlawful discrimination.
Section 113 amends Title VII and the Attorneys' Fees Awards Act
by providing that courts may, in their discretion, include expert wit-
ness fees as part of any attorneys' fees award otherwise recoverable by
a prevailing plaintiff.
Impact This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act overturns the
Supreme Court's 1991 ruling in West Virginia University Hospitals,
Inc. v. Casey.54 This amendment will encourage the use of expert wit-
nesses in employment discrimination litigation (e.g., doctors, psycholo-
gists, psychiatrists, counselors, statisticians, etc.), since such fees will
now be recoverable to the prevailing plaintiff as a part of his/her at-
torneys' fees. Under pre-existing case law, the plaintiff typically had
to simply absorb the costs of expert witnesses, regardless of the out-
come of the case.
Section 114 amends Title VII by expanding the time limits in which
a federal employee may file a civil action following final action by the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission or other applicable de-
partment or agency (from 30 to 90 days). This section of the Act also
amends Title VII to provide that interest to compensate for delay in
the payment of damages will be available to federal employees on the
same basis as interest is currently available to non-public parties.
53. 490 U.S. 900 (1989).
54. 111 S. Ct. 1138 (1991).
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Impact. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act simply harmo-
nizes the procedures applicable to challenges brought by governmen-
tal and non-governmental employees. Federal employees will now
have a longer period of time in which to file a civil action following an
adverse agency ruling.
Section 115 amends the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of
1967 by requiring the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission to
notify age discrimination plaintiffs upon the termination of agency
proceedings. Following notice of such action by the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission, a civil action may be brought within
90 days following receipt of the notice.
Impact. This section of the 1991 Civil Rights Act incorporates the
"right to sue" provisions of Title VII into the Age Discrimination in
Employment Act. In the past, the Commission was not required to
notify complaining parties in age discrimination actions of the Com-
mission's final action on a complaint. As a result, many potential
plaintiffs inadvertently allowed their claims to lapse. This section of
the Act will help to avoid that result by requiring specific notice to
complaining parties of the termination of agency proceedings. How-
ever, failure of the complaining party to file suit within the 90 days
following receipt of the notice of "right to sue" will serve as a bar to
any subsequent attempt to file a claim based on the same action.
Section 116 clarifies that nothing in the Civil Rights Act of 1991
should be interpreted as affecting existing, court-ordered remedies, af-
firmative action, or conciliation agreements that are otherwise in ac-
cordance with the law.
Impact. This section of the Act is designed to preclude challenges
to the existing patchwork of court-ordered remedies, including affirm-
ative action plans and conciliation agreements.
Section 117 extends Title VII, with certain limitations, to the
House of Representatives.
Impact. This section of the Act represents a Congressional face-
saving measure in response to mounting public criticism that Congress
routinely exempts itself from those laws it inflicts on the remainder of
the country.
Section 118 provides that the use of alternative means of dispute
resolution (e.g., settlement negotiations, conciliation, facilitation, me-
diation, fact-finding, mini-trials, and arbitration) is encouraged to re-
solve disputes arising under the various civil rights laws.
Impact. This section of the Act is simply designed to encourage
and authorize the use of dispute resolution techniques as an alterna-
tive to litigation. It is doubtful, however, that plaintiffs' attorneys will
have much interest in alternative means of dispute resolution, particu-
larly given the present attractiveness of large damage awards and the
availability of trial by jury. However, the Equal Employment Oppor-
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tunity Commission recently announced that it is exploring the use of
alternative dispute resolution techniques on a voluntary pilot basis.55
Perhaps this action will spur heightened awareness and use of such
alternatives to litigation.
B. Title Il-The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991
The Glass Ceiling Act of 199156 establishes the Glass Ceiling Com-
mission to conduct a study and prepare recommendations concerning
the elimination of barriers to the advancement of women and minori-
ties to management and decision-making positions in business. In ad-
dition, the Glass Ceiling Act establishes the National Award For
Diversity And Excellence In American Executive Management, which
is to be awarded to a business that has made substantial efforts to pro-
mote the opportunities and developmental experiences of women and
minorities to foster their advancement to management and decision-
making positions within the business.
The 21-member Commission will terminate four years following
the enactment of this legislation. Commission members will be ap-
pointed for the life of the Commission. In fulfilling its obligations
under the Glass Ceiling Act, the Commission is authorized to hold
hearings, take testimony, and take such other actions as the Commis-
sion determines necessary to carry out its duties.
Impact The Glass Ceiling Act of 1991 is a Congressional response
to the Department of Labor's pilot study entitled, "Report on the
Glass Ceiling Initiative," which was released in August, 1991. The De-
partment of Labor's Report concluded that women and minorities
were under-represented at the management and decision-making
levels in the workplace, in part, because of "artificial barriers" to the
advancement of women and minorities to such levels. The Glass Ceil-
ing Act of 1991 requires the Commission to study the issue further and
make recommendations on how such barriers can be eliminated from
the workplace.
C. Title II--Government Employee Rights Act of 1991
Title III applies to employees of the Senate, Presidential appoin-
tees, and certain previously-exempt State governmental employees.57
This Act extends the protection of Title VII, the Age Discrimination
in Employment Act, the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, and the Ameri-
cans With Disabilities Act of 1990 to all such employees. However, a
unique Senate procedure for consideration of alleged violations involv-
ing Senate employees requires counseling, mediation, formal com-
55. 21 Daily Lab. Rep. A-15 (BNA)(Jan. 31, 1992).
56. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 201-210 (1991).
57. Civil Rights Act of 1991, §§ 301-325 (1991).
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plaint and hearing by a hearing board, and review by the Select
Committee on Ethics, followed by judicial review. Punitive damages
are not available under this Act, although compensatory damages are
available in appropriate cases. Interestingly, all counseling, media-
tion, hearings, deliberations and decisions of the hearing board must
remain confidential. The final decision of the Select Committee on
Ethics will only be made public if the decision is in favor of the com-
plaining Senate employee, or if the decision reverses a decision of the
hearing board which had been in favor of the employee. The Act con-
stitutes a Senate employee's exclusive remedy to redress discrimina-
tory practices prohibited under the Act.
Finally, the Act extends coverage to previously-exempt State em-
ployees, specifically those individuals chosen or appointed by a person
elected to public office in any State or political subdivision.
Impact. Title III represents another face-saving measure taken by
Congress in response to the wide-spread public perception that Con-
gress exempts itself from those civil rights laws it extends to all other
segments of the population. Nevertheless, important differences re-
main between the coverage of these laws as between Congress and
other segments of the population.
D. Title IV-Effective Date
Except as otherwise noted in particular provisions of the Civil
Rights Act of 1991, the Act takes effect upon President Bush's signa-
ture on November 21, 1991.58
Impact. The House version (HR 1) of the Civil Rights Act provided
for retroactive application of the Act, in many cases, to the Supreme
Court's 1989 term. The final version of the Act eliminates this provi-
sion, thus eliminating a large degree of uncertainty with respect to the
status of those actions filed after the Supreme Court's 1989 term. Un-
less otherwise noted, the Act is prospective in its application.59
58. Civil Rights Act of 1991, § 402 (1991).
59. While the issue is unsettled, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission
(hereinafter "EEOC") has stated that until rescinded or superseded, it will not
apply the compensatory and punitive damages provisions of the Civil Rights Act
of 1991 to pending charges or to conduct that occurred prior to November 21,
1991, the effective date of the Act. EEOC Policy Guidance on Retroactivity of
Civil Rights Act of 1991, 1 Daily Lab. Rep. D-1 to D-3 (BNA)(Jan. 2, 1992).
The EEOC studied the statutory language and legislative history of the Act
and judicial precedents regarding determinations of retroactivity with respect to
other laws. The EEOC concluded that "in light of the ambiguity in legislative
history and Supreme Court precedent, the issue of whether the damages provi-
sions of the new Act should be applied retroactively is much in question," noting
that as of December 27, 1991, five federal courts had addressed the issue and
reached different conclusions. Id. at D-3.
The EEOC determined that the most recent Supreme Court case that ad-
dressed the issue of retroactivity, Bowen v. Georgetown University Hospital, 488
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IV. OVERALL IMPACT OF THE CIVIL RIGHTS ACT OF 1991
The price of discrimination has just increased a thousand-fold.
With the availability of compensatory and punitive damages in cases of
intentional discrimination (the vast majority of discrimination cases
involve allegations of intentional discrimination), coupled with the
availability of jury trials in such cases, employers are certain to see an
increase in employment litigation.
It is likely that the so-called "caps" will either be eliminated alto-
gether or soon become "floors" for assessing damage awards, and due
to the availability of compensatory damages, claims of harassment and
other forms of unfair treatment will undoubtedly increase. Other
"goodies" for the plaintiffs' bar include the increasing availability of
attorneys' fees, as well as the recovery of expert witness fees, where
the plaintiff is the prevailing party.
Employers must also be mindful that the Civil Rights Act of 1991
similarly amends Title I of the Americans With Disabilities Act, which
takes effect July 26, 1992. Thus, in most cases, compensatory and pu-
nitive damages will likewise be available in those cases alleging inten-
tional disability discrimination, as will trial by jury. Disabled
individuals will, by and large, present perhaps the most sympathetic
plaintiff of all in the eyes of a jury. This situation is exacerbated by
the many uncertainties created by the vague terminology utilized in
the Americans With Disabilities Act. Thus, disability discrimination
cases will be particularly dangerous to employers.
It is anticipated that there will be a new surge of discrimination
claims in the hiring context for two reasons: First, the Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission recently authorized the use of "test-
ers" (i.e., impostors feigning to be applicants seeking employment
with an employer) in the hiring context.60 Secondly, given the prior
exclusion of disabled individuals from the workplace, early litigation
efforts under the Americans With Disabilities Act will likely focus on
getting such individuals "through the door" to obtain employment.
These factors are certain to spawn increased litigation activity in the
hiring context, particularly with respect to the Americans With Disa-
bilities Act.
A second area that will undoubtedly see an increase in litigation
activity is that of harassment in all forms-particularly, racial, sexual
U.s. 204 (1988), should be followed. In that case, the Supreme Court struck down
regulations enacted by the Department of Health and Human Services which
were explicitly enacted to apply retroactively.
Accordingly, the EEOC will not seek the additional damages provided by the
Act in charges filed prior to November 21, 1991, or in charges filed after Novem-
ber 21, 1991 that challenge conduct that occurred prior to the enactment of the
Act.
60. 6 Daily Lab. Rep. A-9 (BNA)(Jan. 9, 1991).
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and disability harassment. Such claims will be ripe for the recovery of
compensatory damages (i.e., damages for mental anguish, suffering,
emotional pain, and loss of enjoyment of life). Sexual harassment
claims are already at reported record highs at many civil rights agen-
cies across the country.
Finally, it is important to note that most intentional acts of dis-
crimination are uninsurable under existing insurance policies. As a
general rule, it is viewed as violative of public policy to insure against
intentional violations of the law. Thus, insurance coverage will gener-
ally be unavailable to protect employers from the most devastating of
all claims-those seeking compensatory and punitive damage awards.
This will likely lead to an increase in the amount of negotiated settle-
ment agreements, at least prior to that point in the administrative pro-
cess at which the EEOC issues its "reasonable cause" determination. 61
61. The EEOC will seek "full relief" (including actual, compensatory, and punitive
damages, where appropriate) on behalf of aggrieved individuals once a finding of
"reasonable cause" has been made. See EEOC's Technical Assistance Manual for
The Americans With Disabilities Act, §§ 10.3 & 10.5, 18 Daily Lab. Rep. (Special
Supplement at S-39 to S-40)(BNA)(Jan. 28, 1992). Thus, employers will have
more of an incentive to litigate adverse rulings following the agency's determina-
tion, particularly where the EEOC seeks the recovery of compensatory and/or
punitive damages as part of its efforts to obtain "full relief."
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